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Contemporary free-speech jurisprudence divides laws that regulate expression
into three categories--content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based.'On their
face, these labels provide clean, clear-cut distinctions between laws that raise or
involve First Amendment2 issues. In their application, however, the differences
between the categories-in particular, the difference between content-neutral and
content-based regulations-are not always obvious, let alone well defined?
1. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REv. 73, 107 (1996); see generally Erwin Chemerinsky,
The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199,
202-203 (1994) (explaining the principle and policy of content-neutrality and observing that content-neutrality
"means that the government must be both viewpoint neutral and subject matter neutral"); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) (analyzing both the practical
workings and theoretical underpinnings of the content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based distinctions in
First Amendment jurisprudence).
Some types of speech-incitement to violence, fighting words, and obscenity, for instance-receive no
constitutional protection and thus are not subject to analysis under the tripartite approach described in this Article.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (articulating the test for when speech amounts to an unlawful
incitement to violence or lawless action and loses First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (creating the so-called fighting words standard that places outside the ambit of First
Amendment protection words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace"); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth the current three-part legal standard for
determining when speech is legally obscene and falls outside the scope of First Amendment protection).
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to apply to state and local
governments. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
3. The first serious scholarly critique of the judicial distinction between content-neutral and content-based
regulations occurred more than 15 years ago. Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981). Redish concludes that courts should abandon the content-neutrall
content-based distinction. Id. at 114. He argues that "all government regulations of expression be subjected to a
unified 'compelling interest' analysis." Id. at 150. The recent developments discussed in this Article heighten the
problems analyzed by Redish and add fuel to his argument for the need for a unified standard.
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This Article argues that a quartet of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions-Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,4 Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC,5 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,6 and Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York--undermines and erases rational distinctions between
the content-neutral and content-based categories. 8 In particular, laws and court orders
that appear content based, either on their face or by their operation, are held content-
neutral by the Supreme Court. These cases exacerbate problems already created by
the Court's adoption of the questionable and slippery secondary effects doctrine.9
That doctrine too allows courts to transform seemingly content-based regulations into
content-neutral ones.
Current problems in the application of the content-neutrality doctrine and the
blurring of the lines between content-neutral and content-based regulations stem
from two sources.'0 These are: (1) the inconsistent analysis and consideration of the
legislative intent and purpose behind the laws or court orders considered by the
Court; and (2) the failure to give proper weight to the disparate impact and operation
of regulations on particular topics or ideas. Inconsistent consideration of both the
purpose and effect of speech regulations, in the threshold decision about whether to
classify them as content-neutral or content-based, causes serious problems today.
Ramifications of classifying a law as content-neutral or content-based are often
profound." Content-neutral laws and orders generally are subject to a more relaxed
standard of review than content-based regulations. 2 Content-neutral laws thus are
4. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1]. The case has been described by legal scholars as "the most
important Supreme Court case in a generation concerning the regulation of the electronic media." Monroe E. Price
& Donald W. Hawthorne, Saving Public Television: The Remand of Turner Broadcasting and the Future of Cable
Regulation, 17 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. LJ. 65, 66 (1994).
That the outcome of such an important case can-and did-hinge on the application of a court-created
doctrine that is seriously plagued is particularly troublesome and should provide reason enough to re-examine the
continued validity of the Court's formulaic content-neutral/content-based jurisprudence.
5. 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) [hereinafter Turner 11].
6. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
7. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
8. See infra notes 62-230 and accompanying text.
9. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986) (providing that zoning ordinances
intended to counteract the secondary effects of so-called adult theaters must be reviewed under the standard
applicable for content-neutral laws); see also Leon Harvey Lee, Jr., Policing the Parlor and the First Amendment,
22 WAKE FoREsTL. REv. 673 (1987) (describing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Renton).
10. See infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
11. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (providing that "the appropriate level of [judicial]
scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis
of content"). "Mhe chances of a law being found constitutional are almost a direct function of the level of judicial
scrutiny the law receives." Roger Pilon, A Modest Proposal on "Must Carry, " the 1992 Cable Act, and Regulation
Generally: Go Back to Basics, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. 41, 46 (1994).
12. Stone, supra note I, at 197. Content-neutral injunctions are subject to a "somewhat more stringent"
standard of First Amendment scrutiny than content-neutral statutes and other generally applicable ordinances.
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753,765 (1994). The Madsen Court stated that "when evaluating
a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous.
We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary
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more likely to be upheld as constitutional, while content-based laws are more likely
to be struck down as unconstitutional.
This Article does not, however, question the standards of scrutiny applicable to
content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based regulations and court orders.
Rather, it analyzes and questions the initial criteria and methodology used by courts
in the threshold decision to classify and place regulations and orders into those
categories.
Even if the criteria are agreed on by the justices, a paradox inherent in the
content-neutrality doctrine will always exist and plague it. The paradox? That a rigid,
formulaic, and categorical jurisprudence like the dialectic between content-neutral
and content-based laws ultimately depends for its vitality and validity on the
subjective, speculative endeavors by individual justices into the often murky realm
of legislative intent. Thus, the problems lie not only in establishing clear criteria that
distinguish between the categories, but also in the application of those criteria by nine
justices in the quest for identification of legislative intents and purposes.
Part I of this Article describes traditional, fundamental differences between the
classifications of content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based regulations.1 3
It also introduces the policy behind these categories. Part II then analyzes the
Supreme Court's decisions in Turner I, Turner II, Madsen, and Schenck on the
question of content-neutrality. 4 It also describes the secondary effects doctrine that
affects the decision to classify a regulation as content-neutral or content-based.
Part I argues that the cases analyzed here, when coupled with the secondary
effects doctrine, illustrate the Court's inconsistent and variable consideration of legis-
lative intent when it determines whether a regulation or court order is content-neutral
or content-based.' 5 Part I also argues that the Supreme Court fails to give sufficient
consideration to the actual impact and effect of laws and court orders on specific
types of speech when it decides whether they are content-neutral or content based.
Ultimately, the Article concludes that the seemingly nice and neat dialectical
categories of content-neutral and content-based regulations that often provide an
overarching structure for determining the applicable level of First Amendment
scrutiny are anything but tidy. The original distinctions served an important purpose
in limiting the ability of the government to distort the marketplace of ideas.' 6
to serve a significant government interest." Id.
This standard, however, still is less rigorous than that faced by content-based statutes. The interest necessary
to justify a content-based regulation must be "compelling," not merely significant. Sable Communications v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The Madsen Court, in fact, specifically rejected the application of the strict scrutiny
standard that generally applies to content-based regulations. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 766.
13. See infra notes 18-54 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 55-230 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 231-54 and accompanying text.
16. See Stone, supra note 1, at 217-27 (articulating the distortion-of-public-debate argument in support of
the categorical approach of content-neutrality). But see Redish, supra note 3 (criticizing the original distinctions).
The marketplace of ideas metaphor embodies the free speech theory that "consistently dominates the Supreme
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Whether that purpose is still served today in light of what amounts to judicial slight
of hand that transforms seemingly content-based laws and orders into content-neutral
ones is highly suspect. The standards and criteria used for determining whether a
regulation on speech is content-neutral or content based are so malleable and
amorphous as to jeopardize the functional validity of those categories. Justices and
judges have far too much flexibility under the current approach, opening the door for
the abuse of judicial discretion and unfettered bias in the categorization process. 7
I. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO LAWS & ORDERS AFFECTING SPEECH
The "most pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expres-
sion"'18 is the distinction between content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based
regulations. This Part introduces these three judicially created categories, including
the legal tests and standards that traditionally are applied to the laws and court orders
that fit the categories.
A. Content-Neutral Laws
Content-neutral regulations and court, orders "may impinge on freedom of
expression but are not aimed at regulating the content of the speaker's expression."' 9
In a nutshell, laws and orders that fall into this category regulate speech but do not
Court's discussions of freedom of speech." C. EDwIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (1989).
For instance, in the Court's seminal analysis of broadcast regulations and the Fairness Doctrine, it adopted the
metaphor, stating that "[ilt is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
the Government itself or a private licensee." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See generally
W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace ofideas, 73 JOURNALISM Q. 40 (1996) (providing
a comprehensive analysis of the United States Supreme Court's use of the marketplace metaphor).
The major premise of the marketplace theory is that "truth is discovered through its competition with
falsehood." BAKER, supra at 6. The metaphor worked its way into First Amendment jurisprudence in Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Holmes wrote that "the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id.
For a brief discussion of flaws within the marketplace metaphor, see BAKER, supra at 12-17.
17. In Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996), Justice
Stephen Breyer suggested that the Supreme Court must not be bound to rigid formulae and categories in responding
to free speech questions. He wrote that the Court's analysis of past cases "teaches that the First Amendment
embodies an overarching commitment to protect speech from Government regulation through close judicial
scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without imposing judicial formulae so rigid that they
become a straightjacket that disables Government from responding to serious problems." Id. This language
suggests, perhaps, a belief among some justices-including Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter who joined
with Breyer in this part of the Denver Area opinion-that the traditional content-neutral/content-based categories
may not provide an appropriate framework for analyzing some free speech questions. Breyer specifically criticized
what he called the "categorical analysis" of other justices in that case. Id. at 2387.
18. Stone, supra note 1, at 189.
19. KENT R. MIDDLETON Er AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 33 (4th ed. 1997).
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target or single out a particular subject matter or topic for regulation.2" They are
neutral in their regulation as t6 both the subject matter of the speech restricted and
the viewpoint of that speech.2'
The justification or purpose for content-neutral regulations must be without
regard to the content of the speech.22 This may or may not be evident on the face of
a regulation or court order.23 In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,24 the United States
Supreme Court articulated the extent to which legislative purpose must be considered
in the content-neutral/content-based determination:
The principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in speech cases
generally and in time, place, and manner cases in particular, is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys .... The government's purpose is the con-
trolling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on
some speakers or messages but not others.25
If a regulation or an order is determined to be content-neutral, it is subjected to
review under a judicially created standard of scrutiny. The United States Supreme
Court has stated variously that content-neutral laws are constitutional if they further
"an important or substantial government interest; if the interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that
interest," or if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative avenues of communication"27 or if "they are
designed to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limit
alternative avenues of communication. ' '"s In the context of content-neutral
20. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that the "principal inquiry in
determining content-neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys").
21. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 202-03.
22. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,320 (1988).
23. Turner , 512 U.S. at 642. The Court observed in Turner I that "[o]ur cases have recognized that even
a regulation neutral on its face may be content based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the
message it conveys." Id. at 645.
24. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, a regulation controlling sound levels at concerts in a public park for the
purpose of avoiding undue intrusion into neighboring residential areas and other areas of the park was held to be
content-neutral. Id. at 792.
25. Id. at 791 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
26. Turner!, 512 U.S. at 662-63 (quoting the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
the symbolic speech context of draft card burning in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
27. Perry Ed. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983) (considering the standard in
the context of a public forum case).
28. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U:S. 41, 47 (1986) (considering the standard in the
context of zoning adult bookstores based on a secondary effects rationale for content-neutrality).
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injunctions-as opposed to generally applicable laws that are content-neutral-the
standard is "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than is necessary to serve a significant government interest."29 Under any of
these standards, it is recognized by the Court that this is "an intermediate level of
scrutiny' 30 less demanding than that applied to content-based regulations.3 t
Although content-neutral regulations reduce the total amount of speech that
circulates in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas,32 ostensibly they are less harmful
than content-based regulations because they reduce speech equally across the full
range of ideas and topics in the marketplace rather than entailing selective govern-
ment regulation of particular messages.
The problem highlighted by the series of cases described later in this Article is
that the task of deciding whether a particular regulation is content-neutral, as the
Supreme Court itself recently acknowledged, "is not always a simple task." 33 As this
article argues, those cases and the secondary effects doctrine have muddled this task
to the point that the United States Supreme Court can state only that "laws that confer
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views
expressed are in most instances content-neutral. '34
Determining what instances of .speech fall within this category is growing
increasingly difficult, as the Court selectively chooses to consider or ignore either or
both the intent and impact of the laws in question. Despite the Court's language in
Ward that "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling consideration, 35 decisions
such as Turner I and Turner II make the validity of this judicial admonition
extremely questionable. Likewise, the Ward Court's statement that "an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others"36 will not make a law content-
based must be questioned in light of cases like Madsen and Schenck. In these cases,
29. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,765 (1994). This standard for content-neutral court
orders is "somewhat more stringent" than that applied to content-neutral laws. Id. This new standard was openly
mocked by Justice Scalia in his scathing opinion in Madsen. Id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). "The Court does not give this new standard a name, but perhaps we could call it intermediate-intermediate
scrutiny. The difference between it and intermediate scrutiny (which the Court acknowledges is inappropriate for
injunctive restrictions on speech) is frankly too subtle for me to describe." Id.
30. Turner , 512 U.S. at 622, 642.
31. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
32. In his criticism of the content-neutrallcontent-based dichotomy, Professor Martin Redish observes:
The most puzzling aspect of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions is
that either restriction reduces the sum total of information or opinion disseminated. That governmental
regulation impedes all forms of speech, rather than only selected viewpoints or subjects, does not alter
the fact that the regulation impairs the free flow of information. Whatever rationale one adopts for the
constitutional protection of speech, the goals behind that rationale are undermined by any limitation on
expression, content-based or not.
Redish, supra note 3, at 128.
33. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642.
34. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
35. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
36. Id.
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court orders that certainly had much, much more than an incidental effect on
particular messages-messages protesting abortion-were nonetheless held to be
content-neutral.
B. Content-Based Laws
The Supreme Court "has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of
restraining speech on the basis of content presumptively violate the First Amend-
ment., 37 The Court applies "the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content."38
It has held that "[t]he Government may, however, regulate the content of constitu-
tionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest."39
This standard of review represents a means-ends approach in which "[i]t is not
enough to show that the Government ends are compelling; the means must be care-
fully tailored to achieve those ends. '40 This test is often referred to as a strict scrutiny
standard of review.4'
Laws that single out some messages or topics for regulation, but not others, are
reprehensible because the government, via the regulations, influences and limits
which ideas may freely circulate in the marketplace of ideas and what messages may
not.42 They are paternalistic by their very nature, with the government telling citizens
what ideas are of such low value-or perhaps are so dangerous 43 -that they are not
worthy of reasoned consideration.
C. Viewpoint-Based Laws
Viewpoint regulations go beyond regulating speech on a particular topic or
subject matter. They regulate one side of a debate or topic but not the other. In brief,
37. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
38. Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). See DONALD M. GILLMOR Er AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS
COMMUNICATION LAW 14 (1996) (stating that "content-based regulations of fully protected expression are subject
to the severest kind of scrutiny by the courts").
39. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
40. Id. A compelling interest "is a justification of great magnitude, for example, directly protecting the
nation's very existence, safeguarding life or limb, or shielding children from lasting emotional harm." JOHN D.
ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 56 (2d ed. 1997). As Justice
Sandra O'Connor recently observed, a compelling interest requires "some pressing public necessity, some essential
value that has to be preserved." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
41. See GnILMoR, supra note 38, at 13.
42. See Stone, supra note 1, at 217.
43. The United States Supreme Court recently observed, in the context of regulations on commercial speech,
that "[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark
for what the government perceives to be their own good." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495,
1508 (1996).
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one viewpoint on a particular issue is treated more favorably under a law or court
order than another on the same issue.
Rodney A. Smolla, a First Amendment legal scholar, advocates, "a per se rule
making the punishment of speech flatly unconstitutional if the penalty is based on the
offensiveness or the undesirability of the viewpoint expressed." All ideas are
created equal in the eyes of the First Amendment and the government may not pick
and choose which ideas to privilege or denigrate.4 Viewpoint-based statutes and
court orders, free speech scholar Geoffrey Stone observes, distort public debate,
reducing speech entirely on one side of the debate but not the other.
4
"
In American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut,47 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down as unconstitutional an Indianapolis
statute regulating pornography on the ground that it was viewpoint based.4
Observing that "[u]nder the First Amendment the government must leave to the
people the evaluation of ideas,"49 the Indianapolis statute established a government-
approved "view of women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, of how the
sexes may relate to each other. Those who espouse the approved view may use
sexual images; those who do not, may not."50
Erwin Chemerinsky illustrates the viewpoint-based category using an example
of speech on the subject of abortion."' "[I]t would be clearly unconstitutional for the
government to say that pro-choice demonstrations are allowed in the park but
anti-abortion demonstrations are not allowed.... Such viewpoint regulation is not
allowed."5 2 Viewpoint regulations, Chemerinsky suggests, also allow the government
to "advance its own interests by stopping speech that expresses criticism of govern-
ment policy, while allowing praise."' The Court thus "reserves its closest scrutiny
for laws distinguishing between the expression of particular viewpoints."'
44. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIErY 46 (1992).
45. Id.
46. Stone, supra note 1, at 198.
47. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 334 (suggesting that "Indianapolis might choose to have no ordinance if it cannot be limited to
viewpoint-specific harms").
49. Id. at 327.
50. Id. at 328. Describing the statute, the appellate court stated:
Under the ordinance, graphic sexually explicit speech is "pornography" or not depending on the
perspective the author adopts. Speech that "subordinates" women and also, for example, presents
women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or rape, or even simply presents women in "positions of servility
or submission or display" is forbidden, no matter how great the literary or political value of the work
taken as whole. Speech that portrays women in positions of equality is lawful, no matter how graphic
the sexual content. This is thought control.
Id.
51. Chemerinsky. supra note 1, at 203.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Redish, supra note 3, at 118.
1997/Free Speech & Content-Neutrality
With these apparent distinctions among content-neutral, content-based, and
viewpoint-based regulations in mind, the quartet of cases examined in Part 1[ casts
serious doubt on the continued validity of the distinctions between the categories of
content-neutral and content-based distinctions.
II. THE ERODING DIsTINcTIoNs
This part initially examines the narrow 5-4 decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Turner I and Turner II to declare as content-neutral the so-called
must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992.55 Then, it analyzes the decisions of the Supreme Court in Madsen and
Schenck to declare as content-neutral court orders restricting the speech rights of
pro-life demonstrators outside abortion clinics. Finally, this part introduces the
secondary effects doctrine, a judicial standard that further muddles the process of
classifying regulations as content based or content-neutral.
A. Must-Carry Provisions: Content-Neutral or Content-Based?
In companion decisions in 1994 and 1997 affecting the regulation of cable
television,56 the United States Supreme Court was asked to consider the constitu-
tionality of a federal law that requires cable television systems to devote a portion of
their channels to the transmission of local, over-the-air broadcast television stations. 7
In deciding whether these so-called "must-carry obligations"58 violated the First
Amendment rights of cable operators and programmers,59 the Court considered as a
primary issue whether the regulations were content-neutral or content based.6 The
55. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385. 106 Stat.
1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A.). See generally KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 204-10 (providing a brief background on the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992).
56. Turner], 512 U.S. 622 (1994) and Turner l, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
57. Turner, ,512 U.S. at 626.
58. Id. at 632. The must-carry provisions are codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 534-35 (1992).
59. Less than one hour after the enactment of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act on October 5, 1992, "cable giant Turner Broadcasting Systems was in federal court challenging the Act's 'must
carry' and retransmission-consent provisions, with several other plaintiffs following suit over the next month."
Pilon, supra note 11, at 42.
60. Turner!, 512 U.S. at 641-52. As law professor C. Edwin Baker writes, "the case turned on two issues."
C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. Cr. REV. 57,
58. In addition to consideration of whether the must-carry rules were content-neutral, the other pivotal issue "was
determination of the constitutional standard to be applied to government regulation of cable." Id. A discussion of
this second issue-whether cable should be treated like print, broadcasting, or as its own unique medium-is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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Court's analysis in Turner I, as other scholars have written, was "driven by its
fixation on content-neutrality."6'
1. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I)62
The law at issue in Turner I, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992,63 requires cable systems with more than twelve active
channels, and more than 300 subscribers, to set aside up to one-third of their channels
for commercial broadcast stations that request carriage.f' In addition, the regulations
require cable systems with more than 300 subscribers but only twelve or fewer active
channels to carry the signals of three commercial broadcast stations.6' Under these
must-carry obligations, cable operators must not-subject to a few exceptions
-charge a fee for carrying over-the-air broadcast signals.66 The law imposes similar
obligations on cable operators regarding the carriage of local, non-commercial public
broadcast television stations. 7
The Court observed in Turner I that the must-carry regulations impact the First
Amendment speech rights of cable operators "in two respects: The rules reduce the
number of channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they
render it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited
channels remaining.'6'
The Court analyzed the legislative history behind the must-carry provisions. It
observed that the regulations were passed by Congress in light of "technological and
economic conditions'6 9 that threatened the survival of free, over-the-air television
broadcasters." It stated in Turner I in examining the legislative intent: In brief,
Congress found that the "physical characteristics of cable transmission, compounded
by the increasing concentration of economic power in the cable industry, are
61. Price & Hawthorne, supra note 4, at 67. Price and Hawthorne criticize the Court's adherence to this
"rigid doctrinal approach." Id.
62. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
63. Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act 1992, supra note 55.
64. Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 630.
65. Id. at 630-31.
66. Id. at 631.
67. Id. at 631-32.
68. Id. at 636-37.
69. Id. at 634.
70. Eli Noam and Carolyn Cutler describe the power-play available to cable operators and programmers:
[Clable's high penetration gave the cable industry increasing gatekeeper power over access to a viewer
by a program provider. They had the power to pick and choose program channels and exclude those
posing a threat to their own affiliated program channels .... With over-the-air broadcasting channels
receiving increasingly over the cable wire and reception antennas dismantled, television broadcasters
were worried about not being carried over cable or being placed on unfavorable spots on the dial.
Eli M. Noam & Carolyn Cutler, Freedom of Expression and the 1992 Cable Act: An Introduction, 17 HASTINGS
COMM. &ENT. LJ. 1, 4 (1994). Baker adds that the must-carry provisions were passed "[i]n response to the virtual
gatekeeper control that cable systems exercise over access to local broadcasting." Baker, supra note 60, at 57.
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endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to compete for
a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues. Congress determined
that regulation of the market for video programming was necessary to correct this
competitive imbalance."'
The Court noted in Turner I that Congress found that cable operators derived
their power in part from control of over 60 percent of the television households in the
United States that had replaced over-the-air broadcasting with cable subscriptions.72
Coupling this fact with evidence that the overwhelming majority of cable operators
exercise a monopoly over cable service, Congress observed that "this market position
gives cable operators the power and the incentive to harm broadcast competitors."73
As the Supreme Court stated, "[bly refusing carriage of broadcasters' signals, cable
operators, as a practical matter, can reduce the number of households that have
access to the broadcasters' programming, and thereby capture advertising dollars that
would otherwise go to broadcast stations."74
This marketplace failure directly impacts the content of messages carried on
cable. In brief, problems in the economic marketplace create problems-imbalance
in the distribution of ideas-in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.
Some ideas-particularly those ideas uniquely and/or more effectively conveyed
by local broadcasters-may be precluded from the marketplace of ideas presented
on cable television. The Court, quoting in part from the legislative history of the
Cable Act, observed that "broadcast television is 'an important source of local
news[,] public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to an
informed electorate' ... and that non-commercial television 'provides educational
and informational programming to the Nation's citizens." 75 Congress thus considered
the value of preserving local broadcast content in the marketplace of ideas.
In sum, then, five justices agreed in Turner I that Congress envisioned the
must-carry provisions as serving "three interrelated interests: (1) [p]reserving the
benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread
dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair
competition in the market for television programming.
' 6
With both the terms of the law and its legislative history in mind, the Court
addressed whether the must-carry regulations were content-neutral or content based.
Clearly illustrating the problems with the criteria and methodology used to make this
71. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 632-33. The Court noted as well that the must-carry provisions "are justified by
special characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators and the
dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast television." Id. at 661.
72. d at 633. As of April, 1997, basic cable penetration had increased to 68.3% of television households.
By the Numbers, BROADCASTiNG & CABLE, April 28, 1997, at 34.
73. Turner , 512 U.S. at 633.
74. Id. at 633-34.
75. Id at 648.
76. Id. at 662 (Part HI-A of the opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter).
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determination, the Court fractured badly. Five justices considered the must-carry
provisions content-neutral7t Four said they were content based. 8 The analysis and
reasoning of each cluster of justices is set forth below.
a. The Must-Carry Provisions are Content-Neutral
To reach the conclusion that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral,
Justice Anthony Kennedy considered three aspects of the regulations in Turner 1: 1)
The terms of the law on its face; 2) its legislative history; and 3) its actual operation
and effect.79 Each part is examined separately below.
i. Facial Content-Neutrality
Justice Kennedy and the four justices who joined him in Part H-C of the opinion
in Turner I adopted a burdens-and-benefits approach in declaring the must-carry
provisions facially content-neutral8 ° As Justice Kennedy initially observed, the rules
"on their face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the content
of speech." 8' He then analyzed separately the burdens on cable operators and the
benefits bestowed on over-the-air broadcasters by the must-carry regulations.
On the burden side of the equation, Justice Kennedy subscribed to the logic that
it is constitutionally permissible to impose content burdens on cable operators,
provided that the imposition of those content obligations is not triggered or activated
by the cable operators' own content. This approach focuses on whether cable
operators' specific messages trigger or activate the obligation to carry the content
provided by local, over-the-air broadcasters. He found this was not the case. As
Kennedy wrote, "[a]lthough the [must-carry] provisions interfere with cable
operators' editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain mini-
mum number of broadcast stations, the extent of the interference does not depend
upon the content of the cable operators' programming."8 2
There are two separate, but related, ways to analyze and understand Kennedy's
analysis of the burden side of the burden-and-benefits equation. One approach might
be called a triggering of the burden analysis. The other may be thought of as a
content burden vs. content penalty analysis.
77. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter in
Part H-C of the opinion in Turner I concluding that the must-carry regulations were not content based. Turner I,
512 U.S. at 643-52.
78. Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined in relevant part by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Thomas, observed that "looking at the statute at issue, I cannot avoid the conclusion that its preference for
broadcasters over cable programmers is justified with reference to content." Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 643-52.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 643.
82. Id. at 643-44 (emphasis added).
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aa. Triggering-of-the-Burden Analysis
Kennedy's triggering-of-the-burden approach is fairly simple to understand as
an "if-then" formula:
" If the content obligation imposed on an individual or entity is triggered
by the specific content communicated by that individual or entity, then
the regulation is content based.
* If the content obligation imposed on" an individual or entity is not
triggered by the specific content communicated by that individual or
entity, then the regulation is content-neutral.
The latter formula, according to Justice Kennedy, described the situation in
Turner I. The content obligations and burdens imposed on cable operators by the
must-carry provisions, Kennedy observed, "are not activated by any particular
message spoken by cable. operators and thus exact no content-based penalty."'
Phrased differently, the content burdens imposed on cable operators are generally
applicable to all cable operators-they are not selectively applied to some cable
operators who convey particular messages.
Kennedy explained this logic with reference to a previous Supreme Court
decision. He distinguished the content obligations imposed under the must-carry pro-
visions from the content burdens imposed on newspapers under so-called
right-of-reply statutes like the one at issue in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.8 In Tornillo, the Supreme Court considered "whether a state statute
granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks
on his record by a newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press.8' Kennedy
observed in Turner I that "[b]ecause the right of access at issue in Tornillo was
triggered only when a newspaper elected to print matter critical of political
candidates, it 'exact[ed] a penalty on the basis of... content."'A newspaper could
avoid being forced to run a candidate's message if the newspaper itself avoided
83. Id. at 655.
84. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
85. Id. at 243. The Court added that under the law in question:
[Ufa candidate, for nomination or election is assailed regarding his personal character or official record
by any newspaper, the candidate has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost to the
candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper's charges. The reply must appear in as
conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the charges which prompted the reply, provided it
does not take up more space than the charges. Failure to comply with the statute constitutes a
first-degree misdemeanor.
Id. at 244.
86. Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 653 (quoting Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 (1974)).
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printing material critical of that candidate 7 In contrast to Tornillo, the must-carry
provisions in Turner I imposed content burdens on cable operators regardless of the
particular messages or ideas they conveyed.8 Cable operators were not, under
Kennedy's logic, penalized for conveying a particular idea or message. Neither could
they avoid application of the must-carry law by self-censoring some messages and
communicating others.
bb. The Content Burden v. Content Penalty Approach
Another useful way of examining Kennedy's analysis is to distinguish between
content burdens and content penalties. When content requirements are imposed on
cable operators as a whole, irrespective of the messages conveyed by those operators,
they are seen as constitutionally acceptable content burdens. When those require-
ments, however, are imposed or triggered only because of the messages conveyed by
cable operators, they are constitutionally invalid as content penalties. Contrasting
Tornillo and Turner I, Kennedy specifically noted that because the must-carry
regulations are neutral in application and not triggered by the message spoken by the
cable operators they "exact no content-based penalt[ies]."8 9
Although the burden/penalty dichotomy is useful for understanding Kennedy's
analysis, Kennedy himself was inconsistent in his use of terms when distinguishing
between permissible burdens and impermissible penalties. For instance, Kennedy
writes that "[n]othing in the Act imposes a restriction, penalty, or burden by reason
of the views, programs, or stations the cable operator has selected or will select."9
At another point, however, he states that the must-carry provisions "do not penalize
cable operators or programmers because of the content of their programming."'
Despite the Court's own failure to keep separate the difference between burdens and
penalties, this dialectic between burdens and penalties provides a helpful heuristic for
understanding the Court's decision.
After analyzing the burdens imposed on cable operators, Kennedy shifted gears
and focused on the benefits bestowed on over-the-air broadcasters. As with the
burdens, he found the benefits were content-neutral, observing that "the privileges
conferred by the must-carry provisions are also unrelated to content."92
87. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (providing that when "[faced with the penalties that would accrue to any
newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might
well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy").
88. Kennedy observed that "in contrast to the statute at issue in Tornillo, no aspect of the must-carry
provisions would cause a cable operator or cable programmer to conclude that 'the safe course is to avoid
controversy,' Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257, and by so doing diminish the free flow of information and ideas." Turner
1, 512 U.S. at 656.
89. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 645.
1997/Free Speech & Content-Neutrality
In reaching this conclusion, Kennedy employed a triggering of the benefit
analysis similar to the triggering of the burden analysis described above. The benefits
to broadcasters were not triggered by the particular messages they conveyed, but
applied generally to all broadcasters, and thus they were constitutionally permissible,
Kennedy wrote:
The rules benefit all full power broadcasters who request carriage-be they
commercial or noncommercial, independent or network affiliated, English
or Spanish language, religious or secular. The aggregate effect of the rules
is thus to make every full power commercial and noncommercial broad-
caster eligible for must-carry, provided only that the broadcaster operates
within the same television market as a cable system.?3
Kennedy concluded that the must-carry provisions, on their face, were content-
neutral regulations that placed constitutionally permissible burdens on cable
operators and conferred necessary benefits on broadcasters. His analysis, however,
did not stop there. Going beyond the face of the statute, he examined its legislative
intent. The next section describes this analysis.
ii. Content-Neutral Intent and Purpose
Kennedy began his analysis of the legislative intent in Turner I by stating a
rule-"even a regulation neutral on its face may be content based if its manifest
purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys."' This corresponds
with the Court's earlier statement in Ward v. Rock Against Racism95 that "the govern-
ment's purpose is the controlling consideration" on the content-neutrality issue.9
Applying this rule, he ultimately concluded that the "overriding congressional
purpose is unrelated to the content of expression disseminated by cable and broadcast
speakers. 98
93. Id.
94. Id. Kennedy's analysis in Turner I reveals that he likely would support an obverse proposition to the
maxim that a regulation that appears content-neutral may be content based if it regulates speech "because of the
message it conveys." Id.
The must-carry provisions were mandated not because of the messages that cable operators conveyed, but
because of the messages they potentially would not convey, specifically the messages of over-the-air broadcasters
that might not be conveyed. Kennedy, as this section reveals, found that the purpose of compelling cable operators
to convey these messages was not content based. Thus, it appears that Kennedy would support the proposition that
a regulation that appears content-neutral may not be content based if it regulates speech because of the messages
the speaker does not convey.
95. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
96. Id.at791.
97. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
98. Turner l512 U.S. at 647.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
To reach this result, however, Kennedy craftily shifted his analysis away from
the issue of speech to the issue of economics.9 He viewed the controlling Con-
gressional purpose as the preservation of free local broadcast television, not the
guarantee that the specific content transmitted by those broadcasters would reach the
public. As Kennedy stated, "[o]ur review of the Act and its various findings per-
suades us that Congress' overriding objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor
programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to
preserve access to free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans
without cable."' °
Kennedy's statements reveal a fixation on the "overriding objective 10' and
"manifest purpose"' of a law as the touchstones for analysis of legislative intent.
The fact that Congress made clear that another purpose-a purpose beyond eco-
nomic considerations-of the must-carry provisions was to preserve "an important
source of local news[,] public affairs programming and other local broadcast services
critical to an informed electorate,"10 3 was not determinative. According to Kennedy,
this statement-a statement embodied in the official legislative history of the
must-carry provisions that was codified with the law---"reflects nothing more than
the recognition that the services provided by broadcast television have some intrinsic
value and, thus, are worth preserving against the threats posed by cable."''4 Kennedy
also described this as a mere "acknowledgment' ' 05 by Congress that "broadcast
television stations make a valuable contribution to the Nation's communications
system [that] does not render the must-carry scheme content based."' 6 He therefore
rejected the cable operators' and programmers' contention that the must-carry
provisions are content based because they promote a favored type of content, namely
local broadcast content.
Law professor C. Edwin Baker attacks Kennedy's logic on this point. He states
that to "quarrel with the majority is more than possible. It is difficult to imagine that
99. Pilon notes that the winners under the must-carry regulations-over-the-air broadcasters--"cast it [the
regulations] as mere economic regulation, the better to render it immune from 'strict scrutiny."' Pilon, supra note
11, at 62. Baker observes that the majority focused on the law's "admirable, anti-trust type purpose... [of]
provid[ing] a fair playing field for television in order to prevent cable from using its control over the communication
bottleneck to undermine the economic viability of (or to injure in somewhat less serious ways) local broadcasting."
Baker, supra note 60, at 59-60.
100. Turner1, 512 U.S. at 646. Kennedy added in the same section of the opinion that:
Congress designed the must-carry provisions not to promote speech of a particular content, but to
prevent cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of broadcasters, and
thereby to ensure that all Americans, especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have access to free
television programming-whatever its content.
Id. at 649.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 645.
103. Id. at 648.
104. Id.
105. d at 649.
106. Turner 1. 512 U.S. at 649.
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Congress would justify the must-carry rules except in part on grounds that the
content is expected characteristically to differ from that on cable and that this
different content has value."' 7 For Kennedy, however, the fact that the justification
"in part" was content based was not determinative. Instead, he focused on what he
considered to be the "overriding objective ' and "overriding congressional pur-
pose"' 9 of preserving free access to messages, apparently regardless of the content
of those messages. 1
The problem, of course, is the inherent subjectivity in determining when one
congressional interest or purpose "overrides" another. In the must-carry cases, it
seems difficult to remove or untangle the purpose of preserving unique local broad-
cast fare from the economic concerns about the survival of that fare on cable systems.
Picking which purpose dominates often may amount to little more than a guessing
game. Guessing games should not control decisions that ultimately affect the level
of constitutional scrutiny-and therefore the likelihood of constitutionality -applied
to laws that regulate speech.
Attorney and constitutional law scholar Roger Pilon illustrates this problem from
the analysis in Turner I. He states:
Winners under the Act cast it as mere economic regulation, the better to
render it immune from "strict scrutiny." Losers cast it as the regulation of
speech, the better to invoke the scrutiny that might render it void. The truth,
of course, is that the Act regulates both property and speech, for to regulate
property is to regulate speech. The Founders understood that, which is why
they protected both, equally. To watch the modern Court try to determine
which is dominant, whether the regulation of property or the regulation of
speech, is to watch a morality play without direction .... 1
Kennedy's own analysis reveals the conceptual difficulties of distinguishing the
dominant or overriding purpose of a law from other lesser objectives. At one point,
articulating the rules relating to content-based statutes, he states that "a content-based
purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show the regulation is content
based."" 2 He suggests with this language that a purpose-even if it is not the
dominant purpose or overriding objective-is enough in some unspecified situations
to declare an entire law content based. Why Kennedy chose to ignore this in Turner
I is unclear but certainly problematic for the analysis of the content-neutral/
107. Baker, supra note 60, at 60 (emphasis added).
108. Turner1, 512 U.S. at 646.
109. Id. at 647.
110. Kennedy, in fact, stated at one point in Turner I that what is important is that Americans "have access
to free television programming-whatever its content." Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
111. Pilon, supra note 11, at 62-63.
112. Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 642.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
content-based dialectic. Perhaps the reason for Kennedy's rejection of this standard
was that he did not even consider Congress' explicit language about the value of
local programming a purpose. Along this line, he remarked that cable operators' and
programmers' "ability to hypothesize a content-based purpose for these provisions
rests upon little more than speculation and does not cast doubt on the content-neutral
character of must-carry."
1
'
1 3
iii. Content-Neutral in Operation and Effect
Justice Kennedy also considered briefly the actual operation of the must-carry
provisions, concluding-in line with his analysis of both the terms of the regulations
and their legislative history-that the provisions are content-neutral.1 4 On this point,
he again noted that the benefits were to all full power broadcasters, regardless of the
content they convey.
115
He added that in shouldering the burdens of the must-carry provisions, cable
operators still controlled the cable stations that they could bump from their sys-
tems.116 This means that there would not necessarily be an increase in local content,
since the cable operator could remove a cable station that heavily carried local
content, Kennedy observed. 7 "[I]f a cable system were required to bump a cable
programmer to make room for a broadcast station, nothing would stop a cable
operator from displacing a cable station that provides all local-or-education-oriented
programming with a broadcaster that provides very little." ' 8
After analyzing the terms of the must-carry provisions, their legislative history,
and their operation and effect, Justice Kennedy concluded that they are content-
neutral." 9 In finishing his analysis in Part II-C of the opinion in Turner I, Kennedy
remarked that, "[iln short, the must-carry provisions are not designed to favor or
disadvantage speech of any particular content. Rather, they are meant to protect
broadcast television from what Congress determined to be unfair competition by
cable systems."' 2 As the next section indicates, however, four justices disagreed with
Kennedy's analysis.
b. The Must-Carry Provisions are Content-Based
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Thomas in Part I of
her opinion dissenting from Justice Kennedy's analysis of the content-neutrality
113. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 648.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 648.
119. Id. at 652.
120. Id.
1997/Free Speech & Content-Neutrality
issue, disagreed with Kennedy both in terms of the applicable legal standards that
apply to the content-neutrality analysis and with Kennedy's factual consideration of
the legislative intent.21
i. Contrasting Legal Standards on Legislative Purpose
As noted above, Justice Kennedy hinged his analysis on the "overriding
objective"' 22 and "overriding congressional purpose"' of the must-carry provisions.
This emphasis allowed him to elevate the economic questions of preserving free
broadcast television to the status of the controlling purpose while treating the need
to preserve local content as irrelevant. As argued above, divining or distinguishing
which purposes of any law are dominant or overriding from other purposes is often
little more than a guessing game.
Justice O'Connor applied a distinctly different legal standard to the question of
legislative intent and purpose. She stated:
It may well be that Congress also had other, content-neutral, purposes in
mind when enacting the statute. But we have never held that the presence of
a permissible justification lessens the impropriety of relying in part on an
impermissible justification. In fact, we have often struck down statutes as
being impermissibly content based even though their primary purpose was
indubitably content-neutral. 24
She added that "when a content-based justification appears on the statute's face,
we cannot ignore it because another, content-neutral justification is present. ''t 5 In
O'Connor's view, then, analysis of content-neutrality does not pivot on the primacy
of one purpose and the inconsequentiality of another. A supposedly primarily
content-neutral purpose will not, for O'Connor, trump or override some other
content-neutral purpose. This mitigates the dangers of the judicial guessing game of
ranking congressional purposes as if they were some David Letterman Late Show
Top 10 list.
In addition, O'Connor made it clear that an evil motive or ill will toward one
speaker or set of speakers is not determinative in the analysis of whether a statute is
content-neutral or content based. She observed that the must-carry provisions "may
121. Id. at 675-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 646.
123. Id. at 647.
124. Turner!, 512 U.S. at 679 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. at 680. Justice Ginsburg, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed with Justice O'Connor's reasoning
that the existence of content-neutral justification will not save a law from strict scrutiny if there are also
content-based justifications. Id. at 686 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She wrote that "an
intertwined or even discrete content-neutral justification does not render speculative, or reduce to harmless surplus,
Congress' evident plan to advance local programming." Id.
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not reflect hostility to particular points of view, or desire to suppress certain subjects
because they are controversial or offensive. They may be quite benignly motivated.
But benign motivation, we have consistently held, is not enough to avoid the need
for strict scrutiny of content-based justifications."26 This suggests that she rejects the
Court engaging in a process of making distinctions between permissible content
burdens and impermissible content penalties.127 Although a law imposing content
burdens may not be intended to penalize the speaker because of the speaker's mes-
sages, the law still may amount to an unconstitutional content-based burden.
Coupling O'Connor's points about the proper legal standards to apply in the
content-neutrality analysis, it becomes clear that, for her, a law may be content based:
1) even if there is a content-neutral objective; and 2) even if that content-neutral
objective is not malicious or intended to cause harm to a particular set of speakers
like cable operators and programmers. A well-intended content-neutral objective
simply will not save a law from strict scrutiny if there is a content-based objective
that is clear from the legislative history. This is substantially different from Justice
Kennedy's analysis.
ii. Contrasting Analysis of Legislative Intent and Purpose
While Justice Kennedy was giving short shrift to Congress' codified admonition
about the importance of the local news and public affairs programming provided by
over-the-air broadcasters,12s Justice O'Connor was paying close attention!29 She
listed a litany of Congressional statements "enacted by Congress as §2 of the [Cable]
Act"'o that make it clear that Congress' "preference for broadcasters over cable pro-
grammers is justified with reference to content." 13 She cited the following statements
by Congress to illustrate her point:
"There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in
promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology
media."
132
126. Id. at 677.
127. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's apparent distinction
between content burdens and content penalties).
Justice O'Connor's point is well taken, illustrating the judicial slight of hand that might arise in distinguishing
penalties from burdens. If it is true, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 25 (1971). that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." then it is certainly possible that one person's penalty
is another person's burden.
128. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 648.
129. Id. at 676-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 676.
131. Id. O'Connor's statement that the must-carry provisions privilege broadcasters over cable simply refers
to the fact that the law gives benefits to broadcasters while interfering with the editorial discretion of cable operators
and programmers. Id. at 675.
132. Id. at 676.
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" "[P]ublic television provides educational and informational program-
ming to the Nation's citizens, thereby advancing the Government's
compelling interest in educating its citizens.' ' 3
* "A primary objective and benefit of our Nation's system of regulation
of television broadcasting is the local origination of programming. There
is a substantial governmental interest in ensuring its continuation.
'' 34
* "Broadcast television stations continue to be an important source of
local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast
services critical to an informed electorate.'
3
Taking these and other statements together, O'Connor concluded that "[pire-
ferences for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and
for news and public affairs all make reference to content.'
36
It should be emphasized that O'Connor did not employ or consider Justice
Kennedy's triggering-of-the-burden analysis in examining the question of content-
neutrality. As described above, Kennedy distinguished the burden imposed on
newspapers in Tornillo from the burden imposed on cable operators in Turner ! in
part on the ground that the burden in Tornillo was triggered only when newspapers
printed a specific type of content. 37 Because the must-carry cable burdens were not
triggered by the specific content provided by the cable operators, Kennedy deemed
them less intrusive on the speech rights of the cable operators. For O'Connor, how-
ever, the fact that the content burden imposed on cable operators by the must-carry
provisions was not triggered by any specific content they conveyed was not relevant.
That the content burden applied equally to all cable operators and that it was not
triggered by the specific messages the cable operators communicated would not save
the must-carry provisions from review under the standard applicable for content-
based regulations, under O'Connor's analysis.
In fact, Justice O'Connor actually cited Tornillo to support her argument that the
must-carry provisions were content based.'38 She observed that "[f]or reasons related
to the content of speech, the [must-carry] rules restrict the ability of cable operators
to put on the programming they prefer, and require them to include programming
they would rather avoid. This, it seems to me, puts this case squarely within the rule
of... Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo."'13
9
133. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 676.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 676-77.
136. Id. at 677.
137. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
138. Turner, 512 U.S. at 682.
139. Id. at 681-82.
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2. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11)140
Less than three years after handing down its decision in Turner I, the Supreme
Court revisited the question of the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions in
Turner I1. By a narrow 5-4 vote, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
must-carry provisions. 141 Although the principal opinion for the Court, authored by
Justice Kennedy, did not formally revisit the question of content-neutrality it began
"where the plurality ended in Turner [11, applying the standards for intermediate
scrutiny. ' ' 42 The analysis in Turner II raises further questions about the decision of
five justices to consider the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions under the
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to content-neutral regulations. Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor again questioned the decision to call the regulations content-neutral
in a stinging dissenting opinion in Turner IL.1
43
In reviewing the must-carry provisions a second time, Justice Kennedy again
blinded himself from the possibility that a content-based purpose motivated the
enactment of the law. As with the first decision, Kennedy reviewed "Congress' stated
interests in enacting must-carry."1" Observing that he was citing "explicit factual
findings"' 45 by Congress, Kennedy stated:
Congress predicted that "absent the reimposition of [must-carry], additional
local broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried". . . with
the end result that "the economic viability of free local broadcast television
and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously
jeopardized.' 146
This sentiment expressed by Congress and cited by Justice Kennedy reveals how
inextricably intertwined are the content-neutral, economic interest in access and the
content-based, local-programming objective behind the must-carry provisions. The
must-carry provisions are necessary to prop up broadcasters economically only
because they originate and convey a particular type of programming valued by
Congress.
There must be something about the content conveyed by broadcasters that makes
it valuable to preserve. If broadcast television stations conveyed only screen test
140. 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
141. Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1183. Justice Kennedy again wrote the opinion of the Court, except as to Part
11-A-1, and was joined in the opinion in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Souter. Id. Justice
Breyer joined the opinion except as to Part H-A-I, and filed an opinion concurring in part. Id. As in Turner I,
Justice O'Connor authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg. Id.
142. Id. at 1186.
143. Id. at 1205-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1187.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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patterns or perhaps blank screens, it is doubtful-highly doubtful-that Congress
would have considered adopting must-carry provisions to preserve this type of
content (or lack thereof). One cannot, therefore, take seriously Kennedy's statement
in Turner I that it is important to preserve "access to free television program-
ming-whatever its content."147
Kennedy himself acknowledged the importance of the content conveyed by
broadcast television in Turner II
Broadcast television is an important source of information to many Ameri-
cans. Though it is but one of many means for communication, by tradition
and use for decades now it has been an essential part of the national dis-
course on subjects across the whole broad spectrum of speech, thought, and
expression. 
148
Kennedy added that "Congress has an independent interest in preserving a
multiplicity of broadcasters to ensure that all households have access to information
and entertainment on an equal footing with those who subscribe to cable." 149His own
words reveal that Kennedy is concerned with allowing people to receive specific
content-the information, the entertainment, the speech on the broad spectrum of
subjects-provided by over-the-air broadcasters.
Despite the link between content-neutral and content-based objectives, Kennedy
and four other justices analyzed the must-carry provisions in Turner 11 under the
intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations.
Kennedy's ability to divine-and then hinge his analysis on-the "overriding
congressional purpose"'150 in Turner I allowed him to trivialize the content-based
objective of preserving local programming in Turner II by calling the interest in
preserving free access the overriding objective.
Justice O'Connor argued-once again in dissent-in Turner 1I that the
must-carry provisions are content based.' 51 She observed that "the Court ignores the
main justification of the statute urged by appellees and subjects restrictions on
expressive activity to an inappropriately lenient level of scrutiny.' ' 52 The main
justification asserted by cable operators and programmers was that the must-carry
provisions are content based because they focus on preserving diverse, quality local
programming. 153 Because five members of the Court refused to accept that these
147. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 649.
148. Turner!l, 117 S. CL at 1188 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 1189 (emphasis added).
150. Turner!, 512 U.S. at 647.
151. Turner!!, 117 S. Ct. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., dislenting).
152. Id. at 1219.
153. Id. at 1205.
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interests made the must-carry provisions content based, O'Connor once again
concluded that "the Court adopted the wrong analytical framework.' ' 54
3. Trouble Spots From the Must-Carry Analyses in Turner I and II
The mere fact that the Supreme Court fractured badly in both Turner I and
Turner II on the question of content-neutrality suggests there are serious problems
in the use of the rigid categorical doctrine of content-neutral/content-based analysis.
The foregoing analysis suggests several sources of these problems.
First, justices can interpret legislative intent--even explicit, legislative intent
codified as part of the law in question-in radically different ways. The must-carry
cases thus embody the central paradox at the heart of the content-neutral/content-
based dichotomy described: A rigid, formulaic First Amendment jurisprudence that
ultimately depends on a subjective, slippery, and speculative analysis of legislative
intent. This paradox will always plague the doctrine as long as legislative intent
remains the touchstone concern of the Court, rather than consideration of the actual
impact and operation of laws and regulation on speech.
Furthermore, when considering legislative intent, some justices apparently
hinged their decisions on what they consider to be the overriding objective or pur-
pose of a law. If the overriding or primary objective is content-neutral, the law will
fall into this category. By contrast, other justices believe that any content-based
objective-even if it is or is not overriding or the central objective-will place a law
into the content-based category. These justices reject a hierarchical approach to legis-
lative intent that elevates and prioritizes legislative purposes.
It may simply be that in those cases involving must-carry provisions that it is
simply impossible to delineate content-neutral objectives from content-based objec-
tives. In those cases, the Court either needs clearer standards-will it focus on one
objective and denigrate another, or will it consider all reasons equally? will it
distinguish between objectives that impose content burdens and objectives that
impose content penalties?-or needs to rethink the very use of its categorical
analysis.
In considering the burdens imposed by laws that regulate speech, will the Court
employ a triggering-of-the-burden approach adopted by Justice Kennedy, Tornillo
in Turner I, or will it ignore this test, as Justice O'Connor did in Turner P? Kennedy
found it important that the content burdens imposed on cable operators were not
triggered by any specific messages they communicated, but applied equally to all
cable operators regardless of the messages they conveyed. The burdens imposed by
154. let
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the must-carry provisions thus, at least for five justices, were different from the
unconstitutional ones imposed on newspapers under the statute at issue in Tornillo. 1
55
The next section explores two other recent cases in which the Court examined
-and split-on the question of content-neutrality. These cases involve regulations
of speech outside of abortion clinics.
B. Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones: Content-Neutral or Content Based?
Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 156 the
unenumerated constitutional right to privacy was extended "to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." '157 Exercising that constitutional
right, however, has not always been easy for women. This is especially true when
anti-abortion protesters engage in vehement, vociferous demonstrations outside the
offices of physicians who perform abortions."5 ' The free speech rights of protesters
run up against the physical safety and constitutional rights of women seeking
abortions in these situations.
First, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 159and then less than three years
later, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, t6° the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of court-ordered buffer (or bubble)
zones outside of abortion clinics. These zones are designed to facilitate patient access
to clinics without unduly infringing on the free speech rights of the chanting,
screaming, pushing pro-life supporters who harass those women.
6
'
1. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
The buffer zone in Madsen was a 36-foot bubble outside of a Melbourne, Florida
abortion clinic.' 62 It protected the entrances to the clinic to ensure unfettered entrance
and exit from the premises.'63 Another portion of the court order prohibited
155. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (contrasting Tornillo and Turner I in a "triggering-of-the-
burden" analysis).
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157. Id. at 153.
158. As Stanford University law professor Kathleen Sullivan states, "[t]he concern with terrorism in this
context is a real one, as illustrated by the fatal shootings of health care workers at Florida and Massachusetts
clinics." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 441 (1995).
159. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
160. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
161. See Ben A. Montenegro, Book Note, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1530,1556 (describing the court's decision
in Madsen and providing that the Court "balanced two competing rights: the fundamental right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy, which is a significant part of a woman's right to privacy, and the freedom of speech
central to the American concept of democracy" (citing Luke T. Cadigan, Note, Balancing The hIterests, 32 B.C.
L. REV. 835, 896 (1991)).
162. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-70.
163. Id. at 769.
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picketing, demonstrating, and using sound amplification equipment within 300 feet
of the residences of staff members of the abortion clinic." The trial court's order
imposing these restrictions was adopted after a prior injunction proved futile in
protecting the health and safety rights of women seeking access to the clinic. 65
In ruling on the constitutionality of the 36-foot buffer zone, the Supreme Court
considered whether the court order was content-neutral or content based.16 The
majority began "by addressing [the] petitioners' contention that the state court's
order, because it is an injunction that restricts only the speech of anti-abortion
protesters, is necessarily content or viewpoint based. Accordingly, they argue, we
should examine the entire injunction under the strictest standard of scrutiny. 167
As was true in the Court's consideration of the must-carry provisions in Turner
I and Turner II, the justices split on the issue of content-neutrality. Although six
justices concluded the bubble zone was not content based,' 68 a fiery Justice Antonin
Scalia, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, concluded that
"the injunction in the present case was content based (indeed, viewpoint based) to
boot."' 69
How did the justices reach these opposite conclusions? The following two
sections describe the reasoning of the two camps on this issue.
a. The Buffer Zone is Content-Neutral
Writing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist squarely
rejected the argument that the court order was content based because it restricted only
the speech of anti-abortion protesters.170 Rehnquist wrote:
To accept petitioners' claim would be to classify virtually every injunction
as content or viewpoint based. An injunction, by its very nature, applies only
to a particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps
the speech of that group. It does so, however, because of the group's past
actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties.'7'
164. rd. at 774.
165. Id. at 759. One clinic doctor told the lower court that the "noise produced by the protesters could be
heard within the clinic, causing stress in the patients both during surgical procedures and while recuperating in the
recovery rooms. And those patients who turned away because of the crowd to return at a later date... increased
their health risks by reason of the delay." Id. at 758-59.
166. Id. at 762.
167. Id.
168. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Stevens in
Part n of the Opinion of the Court declaring the buffer zone content-neutral. Id. at 762-64.
169. Id. at 795 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
170. Id. at 762.
171. Id.
1997/Free Speech & Content-Neutrality
The Chief Justice observed that Florida law could equally restrain speech
directed at a target "having nothing to do with abortion; none of the restrictions
imposed by the court were directed at the contents of petitioner's message.' 72 In
other words, injunctions could be issued against any and all sides in the abortion
debate if necessary to enforce rights in the context of a real dispute, but in this
instance there was no injunction against pro-choice individuals simply because of
"the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion."
1 73
Articulating the principles for determining when a court order or law is content-
neutral, Rehnquist stated the principal inquiry turns on "whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.""' 74 The threshold consideration, Rehnquist said, was the government's
purpose in imposing the restrictions.175 The government's purpose, of course, in the
case of an injunction amounts to the trial judge's purpose in granting the injunction.
Applying these rules, Rehnquist called the restrictions on the anti-abortion
protesters' speech "incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly
violated the court's original order."'76 Rehnquist, in other words, drew on the
speech/conduct distinction to avoid declaring the injunction content based.177 He
stated that the injunction was issued because of "the group whose conduct violated
the court is order."'178 Therefore, "the fact that the injunction covered people with a
particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction content or viewpoint
based."'179 By invoking the difference between speech and conduct, Justice Rehnquist
was able marginalize as "incidental" the speech interests at stake in Madsen.'80
Justice Rehnquist seemed on the verge of creating a per se rule that injunctions
that restrict speech rights should never be considered content-based if the purpose of
172. Id. at 762-63.
173. Id. at 762.
174. Id. at 763 (emphasis added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
The italicized portion of that statement is extremely problematic if applied to the Court's analysis of the must-
carry provisions in Turner I and Turner H. Those regulations were created precisely because of the content that
cable operators carried and/or did not carry. Because cable operators might carry only speech provided by non-over-
the-air broadcasters, Congress felt compelled to intervene and meddle with cable operators' content selection. In
brief, the cable operators' speech was regulated precisely because of the content that it both carried and threatened
to exclude. Under Rehnquist's standard articulated in Madsen, it is difficult to understand how the must-carry
provisions could be considered content-neutral. This is discussed further in Part III of this Article.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. The speech/conduct distinction is a traditional part of First Amendment jurisprudence. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 971, 976 (1995) (explaining the speech/conduct and
mind/body dichotomies employed by the United States Supreme Court).
178. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763.
179. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
180. See Jennifer 3. Seibring, Note, Iflt's Not Too Much To Ask, Could You Please Shut Up?, 20 S. ILL. U.
LJ. 205, 206 (1995) (analyzing Madsen and stating that "the Court first established that the purpose of the
injunction was to control the conduct of the protesters, rather than their message; the injunction, therefore, was
content-neutral").
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the injunction is to restrict conduct, not speech. He stated that "[a]n injunction, by its
very nature, applies only to a particular group (or individuals) and regulates the
activities, and perhaps the speech. It does so, however, because of the group's past
actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties."''
Furthermore, under the Madsen majority's analysis, the operation and effect of
the court order on speech apparently is relevant to the content-neutrality deter-
mination. This contrasts, of course, with the analysis in Turner L In that case Justice
Kennedy specifically acknowledged consideration of the operation and effect of the
must-carry provisions." 2 In Turner I, the Court went beyond legislative intent to
consider the actual impact on speech of the must-carry regulations. 83 This incon-
sistency in the application of the operation and effect analysis is left unexplained by
the majority in Madsen.
b. The Buffer Zone is Content Based
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued on several
grounds that the injunction should be subjected to the strict scrutiny standard
applicable to content-based laws and regulations."8 He observed that although "I
believe speech-restricting injunctions are dangerous enough to warrant strict scrutiny
even when they are not technically content based, I think the injunction in the present
case was content based (indeed, viewpoint based) to boot." ' 5
Justice Scalia attacked-and rejected-Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of the
speech/conduct distinction that allowed the majority to conclude the injunction was
content-neutral. Specifically, he cited a provision of the injunction that suggested it
indeed only targeted certain individuals because of the viewpoints they held, not
because of their conduct.'86 Scalia wrote:
The Court claims that it [the injunction] was directed, not at those who spoke
certain things (anti-abortion sentiments), but at those who did certain things
(violated the earlier injunction). If that were true, then the injunction's
residual coverage of "all persons acting in concert with or participation with
181. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.
182. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647-49 (1994).
183. Id.
184. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 792-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Scalia
identified two reasons why injunctions-as opposed to statutes and generally applicable laws--should be subjected
to strict scrutiny, even if they are not considered content-based injunctions. Id. at 792-93. First, Scalia observed that:
Although a speech-restricting injunction may not attack content as content in the present case, as I shall
discuss, even that is not true, it lends itself just as readily to the targeted suppression of particular ideas.
When a judge, on the motion of an employer, enjoins picketing at the site of a labor dispute, he enjoins
(and he knows he is enjoining the expression of pro-union views).
Id. at 793.
185. 'Id. at 795.
186. Id.
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[the named individuals and organizations], or on their behalf," would not
include those who merely entertained the same beliefs and wished to express
the same views as the named defendants. But the construction given to the
injunction by the issuing judge.., is to the contrary: All those who wish to
express the same views as the named defendants are deemed to be "acting
in concert or participation." '
To buttress this argument, Scalia examined what might be considered the judicial
equivalent of legislative intent-the transcripts of an in-court hearing before the trial
judge who issued the disputed injunction." In one exchange cited by Scalia, the
defendant asked the trial judge, "When you issued the Injunction did you determine
that it would apply only to-that it would apply only to people that were demon-
strating that were pro-life?"' 9 The judge responded, "In effect, yes."'" These and
other in-court exchanges allowed Scalia to conclude that there was "no doubt that the
revised injunction here is tailored to restrain persons distinguished, not by pro-
scribable conduct, but by proscribable views." 191 As if to demonstrate the relevance
and importance of the in-court exchanges in determining the true purpose of
injunctions that affect speech rights, Scalia appended to his opinion several pages
containing portions of the transcript of the hearing in the case.' 92 The majority, in
contrast to Scalia's dissent, largely ignored the statements in the hearing transcripts
in declaring the injunction content-neutral.
2. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network
In Schenck, the Supreme Court revisited the question of buffer zones around
abortion clinics, this time in the context of both "fixed bubble" and "floating bubble"
zones around clinics and their patients in upstate New York.' 93 The Court ultimately
187. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 795.
188. Id. at 795-97.
189. Id. at 796.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 797.
192. Id. at 815-20.
193. 117 S. Ct. 855, 859 (1997). Three specific aspects of the injunction issued by the district court were at
issue before the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 864. These were:
(i) the floating 15-foot buffer zones around people and vehicles seeking access to the clinics; (ii) the
fixed 15-foot buffer zones around the clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances; and (iii)
the 'cease and desist' provision that forces sidewalk counselors who are inside the buffer zones to retreat
15 feet from the person being counseled once that person indicates a desire not to be counseled.
ICE
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upheld provisions of the fixed zones while striking down the floating ones as
violating the First Amendment rights of protesters."9
As in Madsen, six justices again joined in that part of the opinion holding that
the buffer zones are content-neutral while three justices again thought otherwise.195
This time, however, there was very little discussion of the issue of content-neutrality.
The majority simply stated that it was applying the rules from Madsen to
consider the challenged provisions of the injunction.)9 It dropped a footnote stating
that Madsen controlled and quoted that decision for the proposition that "the
injunction was issued not because of the content of [the protesters'] expression,...
but because of their unlawful conduct."' 97 The government interests behind the
injunctions in both Madsen and Schenck, the majority observed, were "ensuring
public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks,
protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-
related services."'9' The restrictions on speech were merely incidental to serving
these interests. The Schenck majority observed that the so-called sidewalk counselors
were still "free to espouse their message outside the 15-foot buffer zone, and the
condition on their freedom to espouse it within the buffer zone is the result of their
own previous harassment and intimidation of patients."'99In other words, in line with
the Madsen majority's invocation of the speech/conduct distinction, it is only the past
conduct of the protesters which causes or leads to the restrictions on their speech
rights. The majority thus had no difficulty finding the injunction content-neutral.
As with Madsen, Justice Scalia again dissented and again was joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas.2°° This time, however, his dissent only indirectly discussed
the question of content-neutrality. It arose in the context of the power of courts to
194. Id. at 859. The majority held that the fixed buffer zones around doorways, driveways, and driveway
entrances "are necessary to ensure that people and vehicles trying to enter or exit clinic property or clinic parking
lots can do so." Id. at 868. In contrast, the so-called 15-foot floating buffer zones posed practical problems in terms
of implementation and enforcement and "burden[ed] more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant
government interests." Id. at 867. For instance, the majority observed:
The sidewalk outside the clinic is 17-feet wide. This means that protesters who wish to walk alongside
an individual entering or leaving the clinic are pushed onto the street, unless the individual walks a
straight line on the outer edges of the sidewalk. Protesters could presumably walk 15 feet behind the
individual, or 15 feet in front of the individual while walking backwards. But they are then faced with
the problem of watching out for other individuals entering or leaving the clinic who are heading the
opposite way from the individual they have targeted.
Id.
195. The question of content-neutrality was considered at Part ll-D of the Opinion of the Court. Id. at 868-71.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in this part of the opinion by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. Il at 859. The three justices who did not agree with the Court's analysis in Part II-D were Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas, the same trio from Madsen. Id.
196. Id. at 865.
197. Id. at 865, n.6.
198. Id. at 866.
199. Id. at 870.
200. Id. at 871. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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articulate content-neutral rationales grounded in public safety concerns. "The Court's
opinion... claims for the judiciary a prerogative I have never heard of: the power
to render decrees that are in its view justified by concerns for public safety though
not justified by the need to remedy the grievance that is the subject of the lawsuit.'""I
Scalia believed the majority exceeded the scope of its judicial powers and was
acting, in his words, as a Committee of Public Safety.202 As he stated, "[i]nstead of
evaluating the injunction before us on the basis of the reasons for which it was
issued, the Court today postulates other reason that might have justified it and
pronounces those never-determined reasons adequate." 203
If one accepts Scalia's argument, there are serious problems for application of
the content-neutrality doctrine. When courts can go beyond the scope of express
reasons for an injunction on speech and then create or "postulate" content-neutral
ones, courts have the power to make any law content-neutral. This is especially true
if one accepts the reasoning adopted in Ward v. Rock Against Racisni 4 that a
regulation "that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others."205 In other words, giving courts the power to create content-neutral rationales
gives them, in turn, the power to transform an otherwise content-based law into a
content-neutral one.
3. Trouble Spots in Buffer Zone Analyses
Madsen and Schenck illustrate, at the most basic level, that Supreme Court
justices easily fracture on declaring injunctions-and not simply generally applicable
laws and regulations, like those at issue in Turner I and Turner I--content-neutral
or content based. That, however, is not the extent of the problem.
These cases raise serious questions about the proper role and weight that the
actual operation and effect of an injunction has in the determination of content-
neutrality. In each case, the impact of the law in question clearly was not only
content-based, singling out speech on abortion, but also viewpoint based, restricting
speech of anti-abortion activists. As noted in Part I of this article, regulations that are
viewpoint based are presumptively unconstitutional.6 The fact that the impact of the
injunctions landed squarely on one particular viewpoint, however, was not relevant
for the majority in the two cases.
201. Id. at 871.
202. Id. at 875 n.4.
203. Id. at 871.
204. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
205. Id. at791.
206. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying teXt (describing the category of viewpoint-based laws and the
applicable standard of judicial scrutiny).
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The Court has stated in previous decisions that a law can still be content-neutral
"even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."'2' 7
Although it was injunctions-rather than laws-that were at issue in Madsen and
Schenck, it is clear that the "effect on some speakers" was much more than merely
incidental. It was substantial, direct and immediate. It should also be noted that in
Turner I, Justice Kennedy specifically did consider the operation and effect of the
must-carry provisions.20 The operation and effect of the injunctions were ignored
by the Court in Madsen and Schenck, with the majority instead focusing on the
purpose of the injunctions under consideration and rendering the actual impact on
speech as merely incidental to that purpose. The question becomes: what weight, if
any, should be given to the operation and effect-the real impact-of both laws and
court orders in the resolution of the content-neutrality issue? If divining legislative
(or judicial) intent is a speculative and subjective matter, then why not give more
consideration to the actual impact and effect of statutes and court orders in the
content-neutrality determination process?
Madsen and Schenck also raise questions about the use of the conduct/speech
dichotomy in resolution of the content-neutrality question. Rehnquist's use of this
dichotomy in Madsen allowed him, at least in part, to view the restrictions on speech
of the protesters as merely incidental to the limitations on their conduct.
The use of this conduct/speech dichotomy parallels Justice Kennedy's invocation
of the economic/speech dichotomy in Turner 210 As described above, Kennedy's
focus on the economic interests as the "overriding objective"21' of the must-carry
regulations allowed him to devalue the speech-related objectives. 2
In addition to these concerns, Justice Scalia's dissent in Madsen raises serious
issues about the extent to which transcripts of hearings-transcripts that perhaps
embody judicial intent-behind the decision to grant an injunction should be
weighed in the content-neutrality issue. His emphasis on these transcripts leads him,
in large part, to conclude that the injunction at issue was not just content based but
viewpoint based. 13 The majority's decision, in contrast, did not consider the hearing
transcripts and concluded that the injunction was content-neutral.?' 4
207. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
211. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 646 (1994).
212. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 184-92 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 170-83 and accompanying text.
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C. Secondary Effect Doctrine
So-called "adult" bookstores, theaters, and video arcades are a blight on the
landscape of many communities today. Some cities have dealt with the problem by
zoning these establishments to specific locations within a community.' 5 One such
city is Renton, Washington, located just south of Seattle.
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,2t6 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion
picture theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single- or
multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.2 17 Adult theater owners claimed
the ordinance violated their First Amendment right of free speech? 8
The Supreme Court initially considered whether the ordinance was content based
or content-neutral. 2 9 It observed that although "the ordinance treats theaters that
specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters, '220 the ordinance
was aimed not at the content of the films shown but instead "at the secondary effects
of such theaters on the surrounding community."' 21 Specifically, the zoning law was
designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values,
and generally preserve the quality of life. 2 Citing an earlier decision, Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.,2 the Court in Renton concluded that zoning
ordinances designed to combat secondary effects of adult businesses are subject to
review under the intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable for content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulations.2 n
Explaining the nature of content-neutral regulations, the Court stated that
content-neutral regulations "are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech." 22 The Renton Court also cited an earlier decision, United States
v. O'Brien,226 for the proposition that it "will not strike down an otherwise con-
stitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive., 227 This
215. Cf Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (reviewing the constitutionality of a community's
decision to ban nude dancing establishments, stating that "It]he power of local governments to zone and control
land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of
life in both urban and rural communities," and providing that this power to zone is subject to constitutional
limitations).
216. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
217. Id. at 43.
218. Id. at45.
219. Id. at47.
220. Id.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 48.
223. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
224. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
225. Id. at 48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976)).
226. 391 U.S. 367,383 (1968).
227. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48.
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statement, it should be noted, was cited by Justice Kennedy in Turner I to support his
decision to declare the must-carry provisions content-neutral22
There is a crucial difference, however, between striking down a law because of
an alleged and speculative illicit motive and simply classifying a law as content-
based because of an explicit content-based legislative purpose. Once a law is
classified as content-based, only then is it subjected to judicial scrutiny, and, in turn,
only then may it be upheld or struck down. In other words, the threshold decision
that the Court must make is to classify a law as content-neutral or content based. The
next step-the second decision-is whether that law will survive constitutional
muster under the applicable standard of scrutiny. In citing the above quoted language
from O'Brien in both Renton and Turner I, the Court confuses these two steps.
In summary, the secondary effects doctrine gives the legislative bodies that
create laws-and the courts that interpret them-a method of transforming seemingly
content-based laws into content-neutral ones. This is true despite the fact that, in
operation and effect, the laws in question-like the zoning ordinances that target
adult bookstores-clearly impact one particular type of content more than others.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Renton suggests some of the problems with the
secondary effects doctrine. 229 "Because the [zoning] ordinance imposes special
restrictions on certain kinds of speech on the basis of content, I cannot simply accept,
as the Court does, Renton's claim that the ordinance was not designed to suppress
the content of adult movies,''30 wrote Brennan. He emphasized that Renton's
ordinance singled out theaters specializing in "adult motion pictures" for regulation
while other motion picture theaters exhibiting more mainstream fare escaped the
strictures of the law. 1 The law, for Brennan, was thus content based both on its face
and in its operation and effect on adult movie theaters.
It was only by looking at legislative intent-intent that, as Justice Brennan
pointed out, was not included with the original law but was added by amendment
only after the lawsuit was launched by owners of adult movie theaters'--that the
zoning ordinance was magically transformed into a content-neutral regulation. In
other words, post hoc legislative intent changed an otherwise content-based regu-
lation into a content-neutral ordinance that was subject to the less demanding
intermediate scrutiny standard. The secondary effects doctrine thus complicates the
consistent and meaningful application of the content-neutral and content-based
categories.
228. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994).
229. Renton, 475 U.S. at 55-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 57.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 58-59.
1997/Free Speech & Content-Neutrality
II. THE FUrURE OF THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY DOCTRINE
Where do these recent judicial forays and the secondary effects doctrine leave
the content-neutrality doctrine today? Clearly the cases illustrate, at a minimum, that
one justice's conception of a content-neutral law is often another justice's definition
of a content based law. 3 The secondary effects doctrine, in turn, allows cities and
communities to disguise-under cover of superficial legislative intent-content-
based laws as content-neutral ones. The supposedly rigid and formulaic jurisprudence
that centers around the deceptively clear categories of content-neutral, content-based,
and viewpoint-based laws is, then, increasingly malleable and amorphous.
If the content-neutrality doctrine is to remain viable-and vital-in the next
century, several issues need resolution. These involve clearer articulation of the legal
standards and factors used in the threshold determination of into which category to
place a regulation or court order. These issues are addressed in this part of the article.
Resolution of these questions alone, however, still will not end all of the
problems with the content-neutrality doctrine. Turner I illustrates that justices can
interpret legislative intent-codified legislative intent, no less-in substantially
different ways. Thus, even if the legal "rules" are made clear and agreed on, justices
will still find ways to interpret legislative intent on the question of content-neutrality
in ways that best serve their personal tastes and whims. As previously noted, this part
of the paradox plagues the seemingly simple and objective content-neutral/
content-based dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence. Although there are
inevitable difficulties in interpreting legislative intent, Turner I reveals that these
problems are not resolved even when the intent is explicitly included in the law. This
throws into question the very use of a rigid, supposedly formulaic jurisprudence like
the one embodied in the current content-neutral/content-based categorical approach.
The four cases analyzed here simply add to law professor Martin H. Redish's
seminal cry more than 15 years ago that the use of content distinctions "is both
theoretically questionable and difficult to apply."'23 As Redish observed at the time,
there is a fundamental misconception "that it is always possible to draw a conceptual
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations." ' Turner I,
Turner II, Madsen and Schenck each bolster Redish's assertion that "the assumption
that the courts can recognize and distinguish between these two kinds of regulations
has proven incorrect in numerous inftances." 6 Redish ultimately concluded back in
1981, long before the must-carry and abortion buffer zone cases, that the content-
based/content-neutral distinction is "pragmatically untenable and should therefore be
abandoned." 2 7 Although this article does not question the theoretical underpinnings
233. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1971) (providing that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
234. Redish, supra note 3, at 113.
235. Id. at 114.
236. Id. at 140.
237. Id. at 142.
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of the categorical approach, as Redish does, it certainly lends support to Redish's
admonition of abandonment.
Before abandoning the approach altogether, however, this part examines the legal
standards and tests that must be ironed out if the distinctions between content-neutral
and content-based laws are to be both useful and valid.
A. The Role of Legislative Intent in the Content-Neutrality Determination
As described in Part I, the Supreme Court had said prior to the must-carry and
buffer-zone decisions that "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling con-
sideration" ' on the question of whether a law is content-neutral or content based.
If the government regulation is '"ustified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech' ' 39 and not adopted because of "disagreement with the message"240
conveyed by a speaker, then it is content-neutral.2 4
As Turner I and Turner II illustrate, there are times when there may be more than
one government purpose. There may be an economic interest in preserving free
access to a medium, and there may an interest in preserving unique or important
content provided that medium that may be lost without government action. 42 The
question becomes which interest or interests should control resolution of the content-
neutrality determination question when there is more than one interest.
1. What if there are several purposes?
A central problem illustrated in the must-carry cases is that the justices
apparently do not agree on what to do in the multi-purpose situation. Justice
Kennedy, writing the principal decision, suggested at one point in Turner I that the
existence of "a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to
show that a regulation is content based." 243 Although he failed to elaborate on what
those "certain circumstances" are or might be, he seemed to employ what might be
called a two-level (or n-level) approach for dealing with the multiple purpose
situation. Under this approach, purposes are ranked in terms of apparent importance.
The more important of two legislative purposes controls the decision as to whether
the law is content-neutral or content based.
238. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
239. Id. (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
240. Id.
241. In Turner I, both Justice Kennedy, who wrote the principal decision holding the must-carry provisions
content-neutral, and Justice O'Connor, who wrote an opinion dissenting in part on the ground that the regulations
were content based, cited similar language as providing the applicable standard. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 643, 676 (1994).
242. See supra Part II (discussing Turner I and Turner II).
243. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
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Under this two-level approach, one purpose can be parceled out or identified as,
in Kennedy's words, the "overriding objective"244 or "overriding congressional pur-
pose."245 Any other lesser interest is denigrated and rendered secondary, in part by
the use of disparaging rhetoric. Said Kennedy in Turner , "[a]ppellants' ability to
hypothesize a content-based purpose for these provisions rests on little more than
speculation and does not cast doubt upon the content-neutral character of must-
carry."246 He observed, quoting a prior decision, that "an alleged illicit legislative
motive"247 will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute.
As noted earlier in this article, this last statement provides somewhat specious
support for a two-level theory of legislative intent. Why? The initial decision to
classify a law as content-neutral or content based is not the same as the decision to
strike down that law as unconstitutional. The law must first be classified as content-
neutral or content based before it is subject to judicial scrutiny.
In contrast to employing a two-level approach to deal with the multi-purpose
situation, Justice O'Connor observed that the Court has "often struck down statutes
as being impermissibly content based even though their primary purpose was
indubitably content-neutral. ' 248 In other words, classifying one purpose as overriding
or primary should not be determinative. Given the speculative nature of divining and
untangling congressional purposes and then evaluating whether one purpose was
foremost in the minds of the legislators, Justice O'Connor's approach makes much
more sense than any two-level theory.
2. What if the purposes are ostensibly benign?
Justice O'Connor stated in Turner I that "benign motivation.., is not enough
to avoid the need for strict scrutiny of content-based justifications."249 This rule must
be applied consistently by the Court. Preserving free access to television certainly
seems benign, but it is a purpose that ultimately provides cover for interference with
the content and editorial control of cable operators and programmers.
This admonition must apply as well to the zoning ordinance scenario in cases
such as Renton. In that case, preserving quality of life and property values certainly
seem like benign motivations. However, they mask motivations to suppress particular
kinds of speech-in Renton, that speech was embodied in so-called adult movies.
244. Id at 646.
245. Id. at 647.
246. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
247. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
248. Id. at 679 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Id. at 677.
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3. Can speech purposes rationally be separated from economic and/or
conduct purposes?
The must-carry, buffer zone, and zoning cases illustrate the difficulties in
separating out non-speech-related purposes and motives from speech-related con-
cerns. Each involved the use of a dialectic approach to intents and purposes.
In the must-carry cases, it will be recalled that Justice Kennedy shifted the focus
from speech interests to economic interests to avoid calling the regulations content-
based. In the bubble zone cases, the majority utilized the distinction between conduct
and speech to avoid calling the court orders content-based. And finally, in Renton,
under the secondary effects doctrine, the Court gets the power to separate economic
and lifestyle interests from speech concerns.
Is it really possible for a court rationally to extricate one purpose from another,
and, in so doing, discard the potentially damaging content-based purposes from the
benign content-neutral ones? This certainly is a slippery and subjective task that
poses problems for the future of the content-neutrality doctrine. In some cases there
simply will be both content-based and content-neutral objectives that cannot be
separated. In these cases, under Justice O'Connor's view described above, the law
should be classified as content based.
4. What does "without reference to content"'20 mean?
In Madsen, the Supreme Court stated that the principal inquiry in determining
content-neutrality concerns whether "the government has adopted a regulation of
speech 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech."'' Likewise, in
Turner I, the Court stated that a content-neutral law is typically one justified "without
reference to the ideas or views expressed. '
' 2
Just what, precisely, "without reference to the content of the regulated speech"
really means is unclear in light of the must-carry decisions. The must-carry rules
were adopted precisely with reference to the content of the speech that cable
operators allegedly might not carry if allowed to control their content choices free of
government intervention. The potential absence of free, over-the-air broadcast con-
tent is what prompted Congress to adopt those rules.
Part of the problem in interpreting the meaning of the without-reference-to-the-
content rule is that the justices employ this term at two radically different levels of
analysis. Those justices who perceived the must-carry rules as content-neutral
employed the rule at the micro level of analysis. What does this mean? Simply that
the focus of the legal analysis for these justices was on the level of the individual
250. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989)).
251. Id.
252. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,643 (1994).
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cable operator. These justices observed that the rules applied to an individual cable
operator regardless of-or, without reference to-the specific content conveyed by
that cable operator. In other words, because the rules applied without reference to
the messages conveyed by individual cable operators, they could be held content-
neutral. No individual cable operator was singled out because of the messages he or
she conveyed.
In contrast, at the macro level of analysis, the focus is not on the content pro-
vided by the individual cable operators but the content provided, in the aggregate,
by cable operators. The must-carry rules are content-based at this level of analysis
because of the concern that the cable industry as whole threatened the content
provided by free, over-the-air broadcast industry. Although cable operators were not
singled out individually under the must-carry provisions because of the content they
did or did not provide, the cable industry as whole was singled for the content it did
or did not provide. Thus the must-carry provisions clearly were imposed by Congress
with reference to the content carried by cable operators collectively.
In future decisions, the justices must decide at which level of analysis-micro
or macro-they will consider the constitutionality of a restriction on speech.
Emphasis at the micro-level allowed the must-carry provisions to be declared
content-neutral. Had the focus been at the macro-level, instead, the outcome might
have been different.
B. What is the Role of Operation and Effect in the Content-Neutrality
Determination?
Recall that, in Turner , Justice Kennedy specifically considered the actual
impact-the operation and effect--of the must-carry provisions in resolving the
threshold question of content-neutrality 13 The use of operation and effect in
determination of the content-neutrality issue raises several questions, each of which
is considered below.
1. How much weight should be given to the impact on speech?
The Court has repeatedly said that the primary inquiry in the determination of
content-neutrality is on legislative intent and purpose, not on the actual impact of the
regulations.25 As described above, however, the search for legislative intent is often
subjective and speculative. Justices are split on what the legislative intent truly was
even in a case like Turner I in which the intent was actually codified within the law
in question.
253. See supra notes Part II.A. and accompanying text.
254. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753, 763 (stating that "we... look to the government's purpose as the
threshold consideration").
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Given this situation, courts should place more emphasis on the actual impact and
effect of laws that regulate speech in the threshold determination of whether a law
is content-neutral or content based. Clearly, in both the abortion buffer zone cases
and the zoning/secondary effects scenarios, the burden of the laws or court orders in
question falls squarely on the specific messages and content provided by specific
speakers. With the buffer zone cases, it is the protesters of abortion whose speech
pays the price. In the secondary effects scenario, it is the owners of adult movie
theaters whose speech rights are sacrificed at the altar in the name of lower crime and
higher quality of urban and suburban life.
When the actual impact of a law or court order falls squarely on the messages
conveyed by one set of speakers-like abortion protesters or adult theater owners-
the strict scrutiny standard applicable in the content-based law scenario must apply.
There is a serious danger that superficial and phony legislative intent offering a
content-neutral rationale for such laws hides content-based objectives.
2. Is the triggering-of-the-content-burden approach useful?
Justice Kennedy cited Tornillo in Turner I in adopting a triggering-of-the-burden
approach for considering whether the impact of a law is content-based or content-
neutral.' 5 The problem with this approach, however, ties directly back to the dif-
ference between the micro-level and macro-level analysis of speech issues described
above.
Specifically, the must-carry burden in Turner I was not triggered by the specific
content provided by any individual cable operator. Thus, at the micro level of
analysis, the must-carry provisions are content-neutral because the burden does not
arise from-or depend on-the specific content conveyed by an individual cable
operator.
At the macro level, however, the burden of the must-carry provisions certainly
was triggered by the overall or aggregate content provided (or not provided) by cable
operators as a whole. The threat of a lack of over-the-air broadcast content on cable
television is what triggered the content burdens.
If this triggering of the burden approach is to be of any use, then, the Court must
be consistent in terms of the levels of analysis it employs when applying this
standard. Inconsistent application will only lead to further fractured decisions.
255. See supra pp. 82-83 (discussing the triggering-of-the-burden analysis).
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3. Is the penalty/burden dichotomy useful?
Justice Kennedy's apparent distinction between content-based penalties and
content-based burdens in Turner I may provide a useful heuristic.216 However, his
own failure at times to properly distinguish between the categories of penalties and
burdens suggests that this dialectic may be merely a matter of semantics. Unless the
Court decides to clearly define and distinguish penalties and burdens, this distinction
will provide little guidance for future decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Profound problems plague the current use of the judicially created categories of
content-neutral and content-based speech regulations and orders. The cases examined
in this article reveal that these problems have not been resolved in the fifteen years
since Redish first lambasted these distinctions in a law journal article. 7
If this rigid, formulaic approach to First Amendment jurisprudence is to serve
a useful function in the future, the problems must be addressed and resolved by the
Supreme Court. If the difficulties with the doctrine are not eliminated-or, at least,
mitigated-the artificial categories will continue to be subject to manipulation and
lead to fractured decisions.
If this remains the case, the categories will also fail to provide the type of
predictability that lends itself to the establishment and maintenance of judicial
legitimacy on which courts depend for their power and respect. 8 Thus, Redish's call
for the abandonment of the categorical approach is heightened by the Court's failure
to resolve the problems with the dialectic between content-neutral and content-based
laws.
In contrast, if the justices address some of the issues discussed in this article, the
categorical approach may be resuscitated as a useful procedure for evaluating the
constitutionality of government intrusions on the speech rights of individuals and
corporations. The longer the problems are not addressed, however, the more heroic
measures will be needed to save the content-neutrality doctrine. The problems with
the doctrine are not intractable. The Court, however, must take pause to reflect on
and articulate clearer standards in the near future.
256. See supra pp. 83-84 (elaborating on Justice Kennedy's content-based penalty and content-based burden
analysis).
257. See Redish, supra note 3.
258. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897)
(observing that law is ultimately a body of "systematized prediction").
